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Abstract. We show that rational expectations do not affect the controllability of an economic system, 
either in its static or in its dynamic version, even though their introduction in many other circumstances 
may make it impossible for the policymaker to affect certain variables due to policy invariance, policy 
neutrality or time inconsistency problems. The controllability conditions stated by Tinbergen and 
subsequent authors continue to hold under rational expectations; and when they are satisfied rational 
expectations may even enhance the power to control an economy over time. This is important because it 
shows that an underlying equilibrium can exist even if our conventional optimisation techniques lead to 
policy invariance, neutrality or time inconsistency. We provide examples of our results in the context of 
recent monetary policy debates.
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1. Introduction 
Since Barro (1974), Sargent and Wallace (1975) and Lucas (1976), announcements and 
commitments to achieve policy targets are usually regarded with suspicion in a world 
with forward-looking expectations. Time inconsistency and rational expectations, in fact, 
are often said to imply that such policy commitments cannot be considered credible and 
would lead to Pareto inferior outcomes.  
                In this paper we approach the problem from a different perspective, by directly 
considering endogenous or rational expectations in a traditional Tinbergen context and 
showing that under certain circumstances the usual dichotomy between rational 
expectations, on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness or time inconsistency of policy 
* The authors are grateful to R. Neck for useful discussions and comments on an earlier draft. Nicola 
Acocella and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo thank the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ for funding. Giovanni 
Di Bartolomeo also acknowledges the financial support of the European Union (Marie Curie ToK, contract 
No 014288, MTKD-CT-2004-014288) and the University of Crete for the hospitality.   2
actions, on the other, does not arise. We show that, if expectations are rational, policy 
invariance and time inconsistency emerge only in the special case of Tinbergen’s flexible 
targets approach. In the more general case (that is unconstrained optimisation, free from 
any imposed preferences or optimisation technique) where policymakers can be said to 
control the economic system in either a static or a dynamic sense, then the 
endogenization of expectations will not only present the policymakers with no problem of 
how to set their policies consistently, but will actually add to the scope of their policy 
instruments – in effect giving them additional sources of effective policy power.  
        The present essay is one in a line of papers rehabilitating the theory of economic 
policy, extended now to multiple policymakers and strategic policy games.
1 It adds 
rational expectations to the classical theory in a single policymaker context and derives 
the conditions for both static and dynamic controllability in that case. 
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the reduced and 
final form of a model with a single policymaker and rational expectations. In section 3 we 
deal with the conditions for static and dynamic controllability of this model and 
demonstrate that static and dynamic controllability can be enhanced by rational 
expectations. We also derive the rational expectations extension to Wonham (1974) 
stabilisability theorem. Section 4 presents two examples of how announcements of future 
policies may help in ensuring the static or dynamic control of the economy. Section 5 
concludes.  
2. The economic model, with a single policymaker 
Without loss of generality, we can write the generic linear rational expectations model, in 
its reduced form, as follows: 
(1)  t t t t t t v Cx By Ay y        / 1 1                 for   t = 1…..T
where T may be an arbitrarily large number; and where  ) / ( 1 / 1 t t t t y E y :      denotes the 
mathematical expectation of 1  t y conditional on  t :  (the information set available at t). In 
this set up, t y  is a vector of n endogenous variables at time t; t x  is a vector of m potential 
policy instruments; and  t v  is a vector of exogenous shocks and/or other influences which 
1 See Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2006), Acocella et al. (2006, 2007),  Di Bartolomeo et al. (2008).  3
have a known mean, but otherwise come from an unspecified probability distribution. 
The matrices A, B and C are constant and of order n, n, and num respectively, and have 
at least some elements which are non-zero. 
        This model can now be solved from the perspective of any particular period, say t =































































































































































































In this representation, 0 y  is a known initial condition for t = 1; and 1 / 1  T y  is an assumed or 
projected terminal condition – most probably one that describes the economy’s expected 
long run equilibrium state.  
        The generalization of (1), and hence (2), to any number of leads and lags is detailed 
in the appendix to this paper. In addition it is easy to show that this final form solution 
always exists, given (1), since the inverse matrix in (2) is always well defined. To see 

































This matrix is of order nT. Using the partitioning by time, the determinant of  T T  is 
(3)  )' 0 ..... 0 , ' ( ) 0 ..... 0 , ( .
1
1 1 A T B I T T n T   

 
However  )' 0 ..... 0 , ' ( ) 0 ..... 0 , (
1
2 2 1 A T B I T T T n T T     

   , and so on. But  . 1 n I T    Hence 
the inverse always exists by induction.  
                                                
2 Hughes Hallett and Fisher (1988), Hughes Hallett et al. (1996).  4
              Given that (2) always exists, we can now rewrite the final form model in the 




































































































(4)  b Rx y   
where  ), (
1 C I T R T   
 } )' ' : 0 ( )' 0 : ' ( ) / ( { 1 / 1 0 1
1

   :   T T y B y A v E T b , and “” denotes 
a Kronecker product. In this representation, each  1 / 1 / , / j t j t x y R w w    is an num matrix of 
policy multipliers for t, j = 1…T. But notice that R is not block triangular. In other words 
0 , z j t R  even if t < j. Hence equation (4) implies  j t R ,  is a matrix of conventional policy 
multipliers between  1 / t y  and  1 / j x , with a delay of t – j periods between implementation 
and realization, if t  j. But  j t R , represents a matrix of anticipatory effects, on 1 / t y , of an 
announced or anticipated policy change 1 / j x at some point in the future if t < j.
3
3. Controllability with forward looking behaviour 
3.1 Static controllability 
Static (or Tinbergen) controllability defines the set of conditions which must hold if an 
arbitrary set of target values can be achieved for the endogenous variables t y  in each 
period – at least in expectation, given that the original model is stochastic. Define those 
target values to be
d
t y 1 / , where superscript d denotes a desired value from the perspective 
of period 1. We then define 
d y  to be a stacked vector of those desired values across all 
time periods. 
        Static controllability, in each period in turn, evidently requires the matrix R in (4) to 
possess an inverse: 
(5)                  ) (
1 b y R x
d   

3 A conventional “backwards looking” model will have Rt,j = 0 for all t < j; and constant multipliers Rt,j = 
Rt,j for t – j = 0…..T1, if the model at (1) is linear. Neither of these things is true in (4).  5
where  y, x and b  are all understood to be expectations conditioned on the current 
information set  t : , for each t = 1…T, as noted in (4). Hence: 
Proposition 1:  
Static controllability under rational expectations, as in any conventional backwards 
looking model, requires the model to have as many independent policy instruments as 
target variables in each time period. Hence there is no generalization or change in the 
static controllability conditions when there are rational or forward looking expectations.
Proof: From (4), T T C T R
1     where C I C T T    . Hence T T T T T T C C T R
1 1 1 1 ) (
         exists if 
and only if 
1 1      C I C T T exists, since we have already know that
1 
T T exists. But the 
instrument coefficient matrix, C, can only possess an inverse if n = m and it has full rank. 
But those are also the conditions which provide period-by-period static controllability in 
a conventional backwards looking model, whether static (A = 0, B = 0) or dynamic (B = 
0).Ŷ
Comments: 
i) As always n = m, well-known as the Tinbergen theorem, is a necessary condition for 
static controllability; linear independence in the impacts of the instruments on the targets 
(together with n = m) is sufficient. This corresponds to the conventional case studied in 
Hughes Hallett (1989).
ii) If the same number of target and instrument variables appears in each time period, 
then the necessary condition emerges directly from the matrix inverse in (5) since R is of 
order nTumT. However, if they differ, then we need  t t m n    in each period if static 
controllability is to hold across the whole policy period since 
1  C I  now becomes 
} {
1 1     t T C diag C . The sufficient condition, in terms of linear independence within  T C ,
cannot be seen from R in this case. 
iii) In the event that we have surplus instruments, m > n, then we may transfer m n of 
them from  1 / t x , times their coefficients from C, to the corresponding element of  1 / t v  in 
(2) before proceeding with proposition 1 on the reduced system.  6
3.2 Dynamic controllability 
Conventionally an economy (model) is said to be dynamically controllable if a sequence 
of instrument values t x x ,....., 1  can be found to reach any arbitrary value,
d
t y , for the target 
variables in period t, at least in expectation, given an arbitrary starting point . 0 y  In that 
case, we are no longer concerned with the period-by-period controllability of the target 
variables between periods 1 and t 1. Viewed from period 1, dynamic controllability 
therefore requires a sequence of intended instrument values  1 / 1 / 1 ,....., T x x  that can 
guarantee 
d
t y 1 /  is reached in period t. Given (4), that will be possible only if the sequence 
of policy multipliers and anticipatory effects,  T t t R R , 1 , ..... , is of full rank: n R R r T t t   ) .... ( , 1 , ,
given an arbitrary initial state 0 y  and a specified terminal condition 1 / 1  T y .
Proposition 2:  
The economy represented by (1) is dynamically controllable over the interval (1, t),
where T  n, if  . ) .... ( , 1 , n R R r n t t  
4
Proof:  1 / / 1 , 1 / ) .... ( t T t t
d
t b x R R y    is reachable over (1, t), using a Moore-Penrose 
generalized left inverse, if  . ) .... ( , 1 , n R R r T t t    But if T  n, then 
n R R r R R r n t t T t t     ) ... ( ) ... ( , 1 , , 1 ,  which provides the result.Ŷ
Comments: 
i) There is an interesting and important generalization here over the conventional case 
with backwards looking models. If n > t, which is entirely possible for small values of t,
then dynamic controllability will be available through the reactions of  1 / t y  to the 
implemented policy choices  1 / 1 / 1 ... t x x ; and through the anticipatory effects of announced 
or anticipated policy interventions that still lie in the future, . .... 1 / 1 / 1 n t x x   In other words, 
the policymaker can use policy announcements, in addition to policy interventions, to 
guide the course of the economy. In a conventional model that would not be possible 
                                                
4 This proposition provides a sufficient condition for dynamic controllability. The corresponding necessary 
condition involves a smaller subset of Rtj having full rank depending on how many policy instruments are 
available (section 3.4). Proposition 2 is therefore given for the general case with m  1.  7
since 0 ,   j t R  for all j > t. In effect, the policymaker has a greater number of policy 
“instruments” at his disposal than in an economy without anticipations. 
ii) As a corollary all  1 / t y , including the targets of the first period 1 / 1 y , are dynamically 
controllable if the rank condition in proposition 2 holds. That too is an important 
extension over the conventional case where period t = n is the earliest date at which we 
can guarantee controllability if there is a single policy instrument; or t = n/2 if there are 
two instruments, and so on. Thus 1 / 1 y is controllable from the first period, even if there are 
insufficient instruments (m < n), provided that T  n and proposition 2 holds. The astute 
policymaker will realise that good communication lies at the heart of the policy problem 
if he/she wants to reach their policy targets in the early periods or at lower cost, a fact 
which has attracted particular interest in the central banking world 
iii) Evidently dynamic controllability is also possible with a much reduced instrument set, 
compared to static controllability. There are two parts to this reduction: a) the ability to 
use one or more instruments repeatedly rather than a group of several instruments used 
once and in parallel; and b) the ability to augment or replace parts of an existing 
instrument set with announcements of future policy changes. 
iv) There is also a distinction in that the  1 / 1 / 1 ... t x x values will be implemented decisions 
when it comes to the controllability of 1 / t y ; but that the  1 / 1 / 1 .... n t x x   values, being policy 
announcements, may never actually be carried out. However, because they lie in the 
future from the perspective of 1 / t y , any subsequent time inconsistency plays no role in the 
controllability of  1 / t y as long as they are genuinely held expectations at that point. 
v) For that reason, we have taken the first n multiplier matrices for the rank condition in 
proposition 2. That is an arbitrary choice; we could have taken any n sub-matrices from 
T t t R R , 1 , ..... . But a choice of the first n maximizes the proportion which represents actual 
policy choices as opposed to potentially fungible policy announcements.  
Proposition 3:  
Forward looking rational expectations enhance the power to control an economy over 
time in that: a) policy announcements may be used to supplement and extend the impact  8
of conventional policy instruments; and b) controllability is now available, with a 
reduced instrument set, much earlier; and from t = 1 if  . ) ... ( 1 11 n R R r n  
Proof: comments i), ii) and iii) above, and proposition 2.Ŷ
3.3 Stabilisability under rational expectations 
We can apply the reasoning underlying propositions 2 and 3 to show that any economy 
can be stabilized to an arbitrary degree under rational, forward looking expectations if it 
is dynamically controllable in the sense of proposition 2. An arbitrary degree of 
stabilisation means that policy rules can be found to make the economy follow an 
arbitrarily stable path, based on an arbitrary set of eigenvalues. This is the rational 




For any economy represented by (1), with arbitrary matrices A, B and C, we can always 
find a set of policy rules 1 / 1 1 /    t t t y K x such that the controlled economy is stabilisable (up 
to an arbitrary set of eigenvalues) if the economy itself is controllable in the sense of 
proposition 2. 
Proof: Equation (1), with arbitrary coefficient matrices A, B and C, can be reduced to its 
final form (2). Substituting the policy rule  1 / 1 1 /    t t t y K x  for each t = 1….T shows that 




























































































































where . 0 1 / 0 y y    Thus 
                                                
5 Wonham (1974).  9
(7)   
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For an economy to be stabilisable at t, it must possess the property that it would return to 
the initially expected path, whatever the initial conditions and shocks experienced to that 
point, if no further shocks or changes in expectations emerge (Wonham, 1974). That 





















) .... ( , ,  has roots in the 
unit circle. And  1 / t y will follow an arbitrarily stable path if we can pick  t n t K K .....   to 
imply an arbitrary set of eigenvalues for that matrix. Suppose we choose iteration matrix 
1  /   S S D , where / is a diagonal matrix of chosen eigenvalues. Then, so long as t > n 
and  , ) ... ( , , n R R r t t n t t    we can pick the required  t n t K K .....   by using the generalized 
inverse D R R t t n t t

 ) ... ( , , and applying a block diagonalisation to the result.
6Ŷ
Comments: 
i) Policies that imply stabilisability are obviously not unique, even if the choice of / is 
unique. We could have used policies further in the past, or policy announcements about 
the future, from the second and third terms in (7) to derive proposition 4 (given T  n). In 
any case, the generalised inverse is not unique. 
ii) As a result, we can infer that a rational expectations model that is dynamically control-
able at t = 1, as in proposition 2, is also stabilisable from t = 1. In that sense proposition 4 
generalizes on Wonham’s original theorem where stabilisability can first be achieved in 
period n.
                                                
6 A block diagonalisation exists since (Rt,t-n….Rt,t)
+D is square, and the Jordan canonical form exists.  10
3.4 A third generalization 
If only a subset of the variables in each vector  t y are genuine targets of policy (say s of 
them), then we may delete the n s rows from each  t y , and from the blocks of policy 
multipliers T t t R R . 1 , ....  that correspond to the non-target variables, before moving on to 
evaluate our controllability conditions. 
The static controllability condition will now be s = m, and that the condensed R matrix 
just constructed should have rank sT. But it is no longer possible to characterize the 
sufficient condition part of the problem in terms of the elements of C (or of  T T and C). 
Nevertheless it will be easier to control this subset of immediate policy targets, than it is 
to control the whole economy. 
For dynamic controllability, we follow the same logic and apply proposition 2 to the 
condensed system. We get, as a sufficient condition,  s R R r s t t   ) ..... ( , 1 ,  for controllability 
over the interval [1, t] – implying dynamic controllability from the first period, as before.
Once again, it will be much easier to control the subset of target variables than to control 
the entire economy. 
4. Examples. 
4.1 A simple New Keynesian model with policy interactions 
Consider first a standard example of an economy with a New Keynesian structure: 
(8)   11 1 tt t t t t t E xf v SO E S O S N I              
(9)   1 tt t t t t t t xE x iE f VS F H            
 (10)  t H  white noise. 
 (11)  t v  white noise.  
where  tt t x yy   is the output gap relative to a non-market clearing trend or the natural 
rate of output arising from monopolistic competition in the goods markets (Blanchard and 
Kiyotaki, 1987); or from tax distortions elsewhere in the economy (Alesina and Tabellini, 
1987). We assume a large value of T, so that the dynamic effects of any external shocks 
will have been absorbed before the policy exercise is complete. 
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CASE 1.The conventional case, no rational expectations: ȕ = 0. This restriction implies 
a recursive system in place of (8) and (9): 
(14) t t t t t 1 t t v f ) f i (          I H F V N OS S ,
and                   
(15) t t t t f i x H F V     






































I NF NV S
form a non-singular matrix so long as . 0 z I  Consequently any required values for  t S  and 
t x  can be reached in expectation. However if only one policy instrument, it, is available 
and no fiscal policy  ) 0 (     F I , as has been the case in most of the monetary policy 
literature since Barro and Gordon (1983) and Rogoff (1985) onwards; or if fiscal policy 
has just one independent channel of influence ) 0 (   I , then static controllability is lost 
and the desired values for  t S  and  t x  cannot be reached in each (and hence the current) 
period. The multiplier matrix in (16) is singular in either case. But the system remains 
dynamically controllable over two periods. Take the first case,  . 0     F I  Back-





















































































ONV NV S O S
The policy multiplier matrix is now non-singular for all parameter values, and we can 
reach any desired values for  t S  and  t x  after two periods using monetary policy alone.  12
       Essentially the same thing happens if fiscal policy has only one channel of influence: 
. 0   I  In this case the multiplier matrix in (16) is singular and the static controllability 

































































ONV NV S O S
 error terms     
in which either policy multiplier matrix is non-singular for all nonzero parameter values. 
So, to reach desired values for  t S  and  t x after two periods, we can either use interest 
rates twice; or fiscal policy twice; or first interest rates and then fiscal policy, or fiscal 
policy and then interest rates, in an “asynchronous game”. In the latter two examples the 






































respectively. But it would still take two periods to reach our target values. 
CASE 2. The case of a model with rational, forward-looking expectations: Allowing 
for the full effects of both policy instruments takes us back to (12); and hence to a model 
of the form (1) with parameter matrices given by (13). That model has a policy multiplier 
matrix  C, which is non-singular if  . 0 z I  Thus we have static controllability given 
arbitrary initial conditions, and arbitrary values for the terminal conditions.  
        So far the story is the same as Case 1 with no rational expectations. However, things 
will change if we have only one instrument (monetary policy) available. To see that, we 
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say, as a particular case of (2). We are interested in only the first two rows of (19) for 
static controllability. But we will need to use the whole system if we are to go to dynamic 
controllability after two periods. The policy multiplier matrix implied by (19) is then:  13
(20)
( ) [ ] ...
( ) ...
00
GL D L T
DT M G L DT L M T
M G LD LTM
  + 
¡
¡ %++% + ¡




[(1 ) / 1] [(1 )/ 1]
... [ ( (1 ) )] [ ( (1 ) )]
.
... ( ) (1 )
GM L D M L T
D TML TGL M T TML TL M
GM L D M L T
DT

¯ % +  % +
°
° +%+ % +% +%+ % +% ° % ° +  + °
°  ±
where  0 ] ) 1 ( [ 1 z      ONV O O ' . The one period static controllability policy multiplier 
matrix (the top left 2x2 sub-matrix) is non-singular as noted above. But if there is just one 
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Hence, for the first case, we can write the one period, static controllability problem by 
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S
whose the multiplier matrix is easily seen to be non-singular. In other words, we have 
static controllability again from the point of view of period t, despite having a single 
instrument and two targets. [Before we only had dynamic controllability over two periods 
in the “no rational expectations” model]. This is achieved by using it and policy 
announcements of what will happen in period t + 1. So in this case we have static control-
ability even if there are insufficient policy instruments.  14
         The same thing happens when fiscal policy is limited to one channel of influence 
). 0 (   I  If we choose to use monetary policy only, the (23) applies again. But we can still 


































whose the multiplier matrix is again non-singular. So again we have static controllability 
at period t, an option we didn’t have in the non-rational expectations case. We can easily 
generate further examples which imply static controllability using mixed policies: for 
example, monetary policy and announcements about fiscal policy; or fiscal policy and 
announcements of future monetary policies. 
4.2 An example: Why Central Banks should try to control expectations 
One of the great debates of monetary policy is whether Central Banks should create or 
allow forecasts of future interest rates to be published. On one side, Rudebusch and 
Williams (2006) and Eusepi and Preston (2007) argue that to do so may strengthen 
economic policy. But others have argued that to do so may imply a greater consensus or 
certainty about future policies than actually exists; or it may propagate errors and make it 
more difficult to adjust policies again later in the face of unexpected shocks. In addition, 
private agents may overreact to noisy public signals but underreact to more accurate 
private information (see, among others, Faust and Svensson, 2002; Amato et al., 2003; 
and Walsh, 2007). 
       To analyse this argument, consider an economy represented by the following well-
known model: 
(25) t 1 t t t 1 t t t 1 t t ) E i ( ) E ( y y H S E S S D U          
(26) 01 2 () ttt icc c y SS
        
Equation (25) is an elaboration of the standard model which has been part of the theory of 
monetary policy since the Barro-Gordon model was introduced in 1983. It consists of a 
short run Phillips curve with persistence ( 0 U z ), set within a standard forward looking 
Lucas supply function (a long run Phillips curve) and elaborated to include the effects of 
real interest rate changes on output. It can therefore be interpreted as either a dynamic  15
open economy Phillips curve; or a forward looking new Keynesian IS curve with 
dynamics. In that context,  t y  is the deviation of output from its natural rate (the output 
gap);  t S  is the rate of inflation,  1 t t E  S  the currently expected rate of inflation in the 
private sector, and ʌ* the inflation target;  t i  is the nominal rate of interest; and  t H  a 
supply shock with mean zero and constant variance.  
        The only policy instrument in this example will be  . t i  Equation (15) is therefore a 
Taylor rule: 0 c  is the constant term reflecting control errors or the equilibrium rate of 
interest; 
 S  is the target inflation rate, and determinacy (the Taylor principle) suggests 
1 1. c !
        To obtain a reduced form for (25)-(26), corresponding to (1), we renormalize (26) 






































































                  
which does not allow static controllability as it stands. However, we can write the two 


























































































where A, B and C are the first, second and third coefficient matrices in (27). The policy 
multiplier matrix for this model is therefore 













































) ( c ) ( c
0 c
) ( c ) ( c
E D E U UE D E U
D E E D E U
Thus, putting (29) back into (28), this standard model tells us that  ) , y ( t t S  and 
) , y ( 1 t 1 t   S  are both statically (instantly) controllable, using current policies and 
announcements or projections of future actions. That is because both the upper and lower 
partitions of the multiplier matrix in equation (29) are non-singular. But since  ) , y ( t t S 16
and ) , y ( 1 t 1 t   S  are current and expected future target values from the perspective of 
period t, this means that the policymakers can control not only current inflation and 
output (in expectation at least); but also inflation expectations and growth forecasts for 
the next period. That adds to their ability to control inflation and output. 
       This example is therefore entirely in line with our general theory of dynamic control-
ability under rational expectations, and makes the case for publishing (conditional) 
forecasts of future interest rates as a normal part of the monetary policy framework. 
Indeed monetary policy would become more difficult if inflation expectations are not tied 
down at the same time as inflation itself. There may be other ways of controlling the 
outcomes of  ) , y ( 1 t 1 t   S  in period t + 1 of course; for example using current and past 
interest rates as implied by (29). But that is a conventional backwards looking use of 
dynamic controllability, not part of the expectations story as emphasized in this paper. 
5. Concluding remarks. 
In this paper we have investigated the relationship between controllability and rational 
expectations. We have shown that, although in many economic models the introduction 
of rational expectations may make it impossible for the policymaker to affect some 
variables due to policy invariance, neutrality or time-inconsistency problems, rational 
expectations themselves do not affect controllability either in its static or in its dynamic 
form. On the contrary, rational expectations may actually enhance the effectiveness of 
economic policy. 
        The rationale of our results can be explained by considering the simple textbook 
case of monetary policy. Here the introduction of rational expectations affects the 
policymaker because the private sector anticipates central bank’s action, changing the 
trade-off faced by the monetary authority. As a result, if expectations are endogenous, the 
policymaker does not face the traditional Phillips curve trade-off cannot affect the real 
economy, and the additional problem of an inflation bias will emerge.  
        In this example, however, the policymaker cannot control the economic system even 
if expectations are exogenous when he faces a trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment. The introduction of rational expectations simply changes (worsens) 
his/her trade off. To underscore the contrast, let us assume that he can control the system  17
under exogenous expectations, which means that, given an arbitrary value for the 
expectations, he can achieve any desired pair of unemployment and inflation outcomes. If 
this is the case, nothing changes if expectations are made endogenous. In fact, for any 
given value of the endogenous expectations, the policymaker will still be able to achieve 
any desired pair of unemployment and inflation values.
7
                In other words, the introduction of rational expectations affects the efficiency 
(scope) which the policymaker has available to solve his policy problem under a flexible 
targets approach, but not whether he can actually control the economic system itself.
Thus, in the controllability case, the invariance result should be attributed to the agents 
having rational expectations rather than to myopia or ill-intentions on the part of 
policymakers. 
                The implications of our results are rather important, all the dynamic problems 
implying the achievement of a given target at a certain instant of time – such as fiscal 
consolidation, the achievement of a set of macroeconomic targets as a pre-requisite to 
create a trade or monetary union – will find an important ally in the existence of rational 
expectations to help meet the goal, if Tinbergen controllability is satisfied. The policy 
problem is no longer a matter of how to find a credible commitment, but of when the 
targets should be announced given to the lag structure of the model. Similarly, 
announcements become useful instruments for stabilizing an economy hit by temporary 
shocks, since, under Tinbergen’s controllability, the stabilisability theorem for backward 
looking models can be generalized to forward looking models and allows stabilising 
actions to become effective earlier. 
7 There will be infinite pairs of expectations and policies warranting the existence of the equilibrium; all of 
them however will support the same outcome. The multiplicity of equilibria might imply a coordination 
problem; but not in the case of rational expectations since, in that case, the problem is solved by the 
sequential timing implied by the expectations process. In simultaneous policy games this cannot be  the 
case (see Di Bartolomeo et al. 2008 for a discussion). 18
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Appendix: A Generalization to Multiple Leads and Lags 
We now consider a general linear rational expectations model, with p lags and q lead or 
expectations terms. This can be converted to a first order model, such as in (1), as 
follows. The (p, q) model is of the form: 
(A1)  t t t t t t v Cx y L B y L A y     

/
1) ( ) (                    t = 1,….,T
where 
p
pL A L A L A A L A       .... ) (
2
2 1 0  with  0 0   A ;
and 
q
qL B L B B L B     
  ........ ) (
1
1 0
1   with  0 B  are both polynomials in the lag operator 
. 1    t t y Ly  In such a model, we can rewrite (A1) by stacking the variables as follows: 
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or, in obvious notation, 
(A3) t t t t t t v Cx y B y A y        / 1 1
~ ~ ~ ~
which is in exactly the same form as the model set out in (1) of the main text. 